

MULLER'S ATHEISM NOT JASPERS by Glenn C. Wood 2 February 2003, posted
18 February 2003, TA57, C4

Comment on TA57 {g}

<1> HM, if understood, says Jaspers treats "structures of thinking ... with a relation to reality ("being"), which is either seen as mind-independent or left undefined, and ... oscillation between MIR and as-if-MIR" results. "In the O-D [zero-derivation] view, their relation can be unambiguously defined: ..."

<2> On the surface the importance of this statement seems to be recognition of some substantial difference between Karl Jaspers and HM -- even if presented as an as-if possibility. That would be a very important concession for the Karl Jaspers' Forum. This differentiation clearly shows that zero-derivation philosophy is -- in theological categorization -- atheism whereas Jaspers Existenz philosophy is theistic and biblical. Thus visitors to "KJF" should be forewarned if they are hoping to find Jaspers unambiguously defined.

<3> What remains is the question whether the MIR / as-if-MIR (using the terms in view of their limitations) of Jaspers spins differently that the HM's zero-derivation of SE structures of ongoing experience which is more MIR-reversed though claimed to be merely as-if-MIR. The stated difference could be interpreted as defensive imagination, almost a religious dogmatic reassurance of stability offered in zero derivation. One can unambiguously define anything or nothing, thus especially satisfying those seeking God or definitive absolutes in some traditional personage.

<4> Oscillation when applied to Jaspers would be more like pulsating; it milks being, which has potential source in Being. It's hard to misrepresent normal reality, i.e., only in pulsation will cows give effectively -- heifers notwithstanding (my farming experience includes--as should Glasersfeld's farming days in Ireland -- pulsating milking machines). I get the idea from HM that "oscillation" is defined as waffling more than pulsating when applied to Jaspers and that higher yields result from sucking in a vacuum. The implication seems to be that MIR/as-if-MIR is waffling, more than the vibrant pulsation between transcendence and immanence. Both Jaspers and HM want to prevent science from becoming God (to Jaspers) and a god (to HM). Jaspers leans toward MIR where philosophical faith and revelation is concerned but admits ambiguity is present even unavoidable but not to be sought systematically from zero. The distinction could be worded: Jaspers wants to avoid rationalism, and HM might prefer ignoring rationalism -- in his role playing.

<5> HM states in TA57 {g} that the "... traditional MIR-view ... lacks the awareness that it is created within SE [subjective experience]." Tradition implies

criterion, i.e. an established standard for truth-determination based on chronic consensus to authority (such as prolonged use of O-D to establish transcendent truth) and when religion is based on tradition it means knowledge of church history more than the biblical faith. If that is what is traditional to HM then a MIR-view is quantified and modifiable and becomes a word-concept with waffling potential lacking waffling awareness. It, tradition, is not the biblical MIR-faith which recognizes the feathering out of consciousness on both ends ("... faith does not require a rational grounding" says Ernst von Glasersfeld, "Does representation need reality?" Vienna, May, 97). Jaspers does not lack the awareness that the kingdom of God is within us, and that it is restructured within subjective experience when thought or talked about.

<6> Whether MIR (meaningfully including a balanced view of mind where the boundaries, the peripheries, consciousness is more than what can be reduced to a rational but naive dogmatic unambiguity incapable of self-contradiction), or for Jaspers: "whether the One exists, cannot be answered" for knowledge (TA57{i}). It seems to me this is not so much waffling, foolish talk, oscillation, as it is honesty. It is believed not "as-if" but preferably what are the consequences if not believed. HM suggests the "nonstructured SE [subjective experience] is at the center of the mind" (TA55 C12<2>), and that suggests the mind is known, consciousness is known, localized, and that certitude is milked from images. The presumed non-structured encompassing cannot escape the beguiling but appealing forms and contents of the mind. The dogmatism of mind-independent reality in zero derivation gives birth to black holes rather than universes.

<7> The value of "O-D" is seen in HM providing the instrument (KJF) to oppose ... it, and though it might not be obvious, I'm grateful, for it's only right that the role-playing dogmatic hand that feeds risked being bit and what's worse, kissed.

VANITY PRESS, JASPERS AS EMPIRICIST, CATHOLICISM, "DAVID HUME"
WHOM?

by Glenn C Wood 25 June 2003, posted 8 July 2003 TA57, C18,

Karl Jaspers: "... I am a thorough going unprejudiced empiricist ..." (with some of my off the cuff venting about mystery, miracles, and the vanity press -- regarding TA57R6).

<1> DAVID WHOM QUESTIONS

How interesting this pseudonym "David Hume." Did the author or publisher give any reason for anonymity? Why would one disregard Hume's forthrightness and

appear hidden behind his name? Does the publisher have a freedom of information policy or some obligation to historical accountability? How could a researcher, especially a psychiatric orientated reader (HM), seriously report on a fictitious -- without a case history -- author's ideas? Could the riddle of authorship be unfolded in the fact that Hume's *The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* was not published until decades after it was prepared and three years after his death? By what miracle did Hume survive extermination after writing the first Enquiry against miracles? Is this fear of extermination behind "David Hume?"

<2> ANONYMITY AND VANITY AS REASON

One conceivable reason for the mystery is that the author is situated in an institution, which permits the publication of a work only if the association between author and institution is avoided. Another reason might be that one has a low self esteem, feels inadequate due to some lack of title, experience, or maybe has been awarded an honorable Degree -- doesn't want to dishonor the hand that gave it -- but can afford to pay for publication. Perhaps the publisher is seeking dignification by association for what could appear as vanity-press conduct. If one produced a work that could be sold to members of one's group there would be no need for anonymity. Vanity is possible, in the sense that if the reviews and sales are good, authorship can then be leaked.

<3> MORE MUSINGS ABOUT MOTIVES

There's another possibility. It is to present any view but the correct Hume, as in an attempt to discredit the real Hume and the historical circumstances in which he wrote. If one wanted to discredit Karl Jaspers -- because he might be correctly comprehended and thereby a risk to a favored movement -- one might do a work, call it "Karl Jaspers" and misrepresent his views. It's not easy to get away with this though with someone as current and lucid as Jaspers.

<4> CONCEPTUAL PUZZLES ARE NOT MYSTERIES INDEPENDENT OF CONJURING

I've not been quiet regarding my cynicism relative to the KJF; it's a radical cynicism based on the intensity of Karl Jaspers' cultural influence and the inadequacy of institutionalism in various forms, such as in institutional religion (including a trend toward a religion of evolution). I'd be equally suspicious of a criticism of Hume's empiricism by comparing him with an off-the-wall "DH" -- apparition. Considering the amount of displeasure Hume caused miracle-based religion, it's reasonable to wonder about possible subtle influences leading to misusing his name. Such misuse could develop anytime with either Hume or Jaspers. If saints are pounced on and made Church Saints, then skeptics can be

pounced on and misrepresented too. Heretics and saints would be punished and rewarded by the miraculous institution evolving the Kingdom of God on earth. Such use of nobility or notoriety was referred to in TA51, i.e. the angelic apparition appearing to Joseph Smith and the anxiety surrounding the separation of Church and State. (An anxiety partially justified by the law to make no law, now being misinterpreted and established by the misuse of the separation of Church and State as seen now to mean protecting Church sex abusers from due process. Administrators and executioners of the law, prosecutors, are deciding not to pursue the prosecution of bishops and priests, using the separation of C and S as the rationale, a rationale defended if the executioners of the law can refer to a Church's recorded policy.) I'm implying it's possible there's a mind-set behind the KJF idea, and that HM is outstanding enough to be pounced on and misused. Jaspers is a great disturber, as was Hume -- and those disturbed can react one way or another.

<5> COLLUSION?

On the surface it appears as a compliment that HM would be asked by this publisher to review the "David Hume" work. But it adds to the conceptual puzzle: Why would a publisher who is about to publish a book ask for an objective review of it from HM? Is it a grand journalistic schizophrenic scheme in proportion to the power of the industry? Does the author in collusion easily predict it with the Publisher that HM will bash one Hume explicitly and implicitly the real Hume?

<6> SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

There's an implication here that a criticism of the pseudonymous work is an effective off-the-wall criticism of the real Hume. After all let's not forget Hume was critical of the principles upon which Catholicity stood -- miracles conjured and exploited -- and remains the foundation. Though I don't have the advantage of the prepublication work, I would say that though HM's critique may be valid, it may not be fairly apply to David Hume and John Locke, for they were using experience not far removed from a dominating culture conducive to apparitions, and what could not be overlooked was the reality of the imposing force of the Church and the subjective responsibility of handling that part of experience. After all when Hume postpones till death the publication of some work, and "David Hume" fears the use of his name, this has to be an objective awareness of an objectivity that is real enough....

<7> "HIERARCHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS" AND EMPIRICISM

In TA39C47 there's an exchange between Rifat and myself. He was puzzling over the "mystery" of apparitions. I asked if it did not seem strange that these

miracles were witnessed in some cultures and not in others. The cultural shift, I indicated, was manifested in the paradigm of an incarnation of the virgin in the virgin queen of England. It inclined a culture toward empiricism, not miracles. The cultural trend discouraged seeing that which distracts from an autonomous English State declaring its independence from the continental Church and from the strength of its traditions. Though seeming to seriously struggle with this puzzle, Rifat seemed uneasy with applying a common sense zero derivation thought process to the situation. The miracle of Catholic ontology could not be shed -- but disturbed. It was engrained culturally and not subjected to serious doubt, though for Rifat it had been ... refined ..., so-to-say, into a "hierarchy of consciousness."

<8> ADDING CASE EXAMPLES TO GEN. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

It would seem to me that HM's guarded criticism could more easily apply to such views as expressed by the authors of TA53, TA55, and TA60 (Is "Grandpierre" a pseudonym for a secular saint or an apparition required for a religion of evolution?). Where do these case-views fit in a general psychopathology ? In a chapter on apparitions, as case examples of aberrations from empirically grounded general consciousness. Here is where "Abstract Theory and abstraction ladder" could be placed, and visions of seeing thinking and remembering Amoebae too, as well as Grandpierre's fundamental ontology phrased as instincts and basic principles, the world of instincts and pre human consciousness (not to omit the hierarchy of consciousness mentioned above). In Jaspers' General Psychopathology their phenomenologies, fundamentalism, fit like pieces of puzzles in the section on Abnormal Psychic Phenomena.

<9> CONCLUSION

Those abnormal psychic phenomena elevated to principles could then be found in that first section of five introduced with Jaspers comment that "In the first five parts I hope I am a thorough going empiricist and that I am successful in my fight against platitudinous speculation, dogmatic theorizing and absolutism in every form." (p. 46, university of Chicago Press, The University of Toronto Press, English translation 1963.) Perhaps it's the place also for pseudo "David Hume" and all the data so far said about it.

GIVENS VS. CONJURED WILLY-NILLY UNSTRUCTURES by Glenn C. Wood 12 July 2003, posted 22 July 2003, TA57, C22

{1} Wood's Reply to HM's TA57R7. - The following is lengthy and is more spontaneous than desirable. Your R7 is repeated with my comments [bracketed]

within the text. – GW

{2} [1] Because we posit mental mind-and-nature structures, we are responsible for them.

[And in some even greater ways responsible for those found postulated in the being that we are in, i.e., born into.]

{3} This can become a heavy burden, and prompts the invention of methods like revelation

[Is there some disdain detectable here toward believers in revelation; that is, believers in more than conjuring? It sounds a bit like "Intolerant disdain in the guise of indifferent tolerance ... It is apathy toward human seriousness. It is the very untruthfulness that will submerge reason in the rationalistic intellect." Jaspers is suggesting something more than indifference when considering the seriousness of revelation. (Philosophical Faith and Revelation, fourth paragraph from end of "Can the Two Faiths meet?")]

{4} and other ways of obtaining structures with built-in certainty

[Such as the miraculous subjective handling of ongoing experience, a fixed self reliance, an intense certitude for out-of-the-blue handling of experience],

{5} given to us ready-made by postulated outside sources

[Some of those postulated authorities have quite a kick and I didn't postulate them].

{6} Such authorities serve as (posited) Archimedean points (i.e., for structuring and moving us as well as the world).

[Would you include Anaximander and the "apeiron" as a primary point, a start and stop point for divine inspiration moving thought along as a quantum machine for specific purpose, and that he and his thought is a method used as revelation in some general way?]

{7} This can be done for specific questions, but for overall experience, religions provide stable practices and belief structures.

[This sort of sentence crops up often as though part of a chanted litany. Is it an "Archimedean" point, a revelation that provides stable and predictable practices? How does this belief in the role of religion jibe with your comment below that the Thirty Years War was primarily about religion? I mean R7 is probably an example

of specific questioning. Let's see later what happens with your handling of the specific Thirty Year War. Your structure proceeds from your general experience and includes misconceptions accepted as certain truth and by a empirically pragmatic definition of religion; the structure amounts to belief or a stable platform swooping across history. The chant is passively but somewhat aggressively uttered and responsible interpretation is left to others.]

{8} [2] The main difficulty here is that no mental structures can cover the whole of experience; because the center of experience, the source of structures, remains unstructured

[Edictal revelation. Show me one person born into an unstructured world].

{9} Any structure which claims to do that will inevitably present paradoxes [Paradox is an inevitable result of man's reflection -- Kierkegaard].

{10}

For the Dalai Lama, you note <5> that you thought he was embarrassed about the notion of re-incarnation, a belief that clashes with most people's ideas of what is possible. If he really was embarrassed about that, I would think it is a good sign.*

[Me too, that was my point. But let's not confuse re-incarnation with incarnation or the brain being prior in some way to the mind, for that involves forms of thinking. Re-incarnation is abnormal -- inherited structures need completion, the status quo authoritarian flow, mysteriously unbreakable, so ancestral mysterious connections are convenient tools for keeping the less stable in their place. Incarnation is normal -- such as the constant need for the word (like mind) becoming flesh (like brain).* By the way, the Dalai Lama is exploiting and establishing the Tibetan's culture of reincarnation by calling for choosing a reincarnated successor by other means than the traditional way. He suggests it should be done more in the manner in which a pope is selected. I understand the traditional way would mean selecting locally, but in Tibet Chinese now outnumber Tibetans. He warns that if the traditional selection is followed, the reincarnation will take place outside Tibet. Where that might occur ? You suppose in the person of the next pope ? If one considers the Tibet culture as an example of a continuation of revelation it's easy to see why a democratic republic is feared -- unless a China becomes a democratic republic. Isn't this an embarrassing revelation?]

{11} [3] Theistic doctrines pose similar problems, only more so

[Theistic formulations cause problems greater than the belief in re-incarnation?

Some are comparable like predestination, divine lineage, papal succession ...].

{12}

For instance the idea of incarnation <3> of an abstract absolute principle like a world spirit

[Do you mean returning to that "most central part of experience, including perhaps even mystical procedures like the union of the individual with the absolute" -- [4] below? Consciousness becoming aware of its self involves such insoluble enigma]

{13} or God in a human being is absurd

[You, in [4] below, state "absurdity can prompt intense reflection ...". I say Revelation can reveal through concealment -- as absolute certainty is shattered by mystery -- and you can call this absurd but without disdain while remembering the self is suspended between itself and the Transcendent.]

{14} As Tertullian said in a related context : credo quia absurdum; and if the believers could manage to be embarrassed about the absurdity, it might facilitate discussion.** He believed because he knew he needed to

[I think he believed rather than knew, for it's common in religious talk to confuse faith and knowledge but if we are going to use the two words we need to make distinctions between what is empirical certitude and what is certitude for taking leaps into the unknown during times requiring immediate decision. What is usually meant by an enthusiastic "I know something mysterious just like I know a tree exists" would be the sort of language Tertullian would use, similar to the biblical Paul saying I know whom I have believed -- except Paul had the phenomenal experience on the Road to Damascus and by that experience could say "I know..." Tertullian believed because he felt the need. His background fitted him for a nonecclesiastical delivery of the message about the incarnation of the holy spirit within the individual, and his feeling for the need of the millennium was also quite natural, given the precariousness of the times and the welfare of the people. His manner of delivery was needed by the people whose emotional needs were not being met by ecclesiastical talk. Also creeds are too limited. That's why in America, in breaking with the authoritarian religious institutions, there was a sectarian movement away from traditional creeds replaced by: no creed but the Bible.]

{15} The same applies to revelation and some other concepts. The absurdity does not have to undo the beneficial effects of religion

[But aren't you saying here the reason or ground of absurdity is a fiction ? In a view of history would you say good would have been affected without the absurdity of consciousness-as-such and it's more mysterious ground?].

{16} There ought to be no harm in acknowledging that religion has an irrational center

[Don't you mean non-rational, for this seems more consistent with your "central part of experience, including perhaps even mystical procedures like union of the individual with the absolute" ? Regarding Philosophical Logic Jaspers talks about the sphere of your irrational and my non-rational but wisely uses neither: "If it is the paradox of philosophizing that in the objective it does not yet possess an object, what then, is philosophical thinking ? If we call objectified thinking rational, then any thinking which, guided by the objective, goes beyond this is itself no longer rational, although at each step bound to rational acts." Can we agree then that neither irrational nor non-rational represents a penetration of the rational without losing reason and contact with the world ? As you probably know, Jaspers uses reason for that area beyond, or counter to, the rational where rationalizations are seen and can be clarified.]

{17} (the center is either structured in an irrational way, or else unstructured),
[You see here what happens on the other side of rationalization when it is irrational ? You let go of at least a tippy-toe touch of the rational, and then do the same thing you're warning against, i.e. you talk about some assent to the possibility of union with an absolute.]

{18} quite the contrary : so does all human thinking, including science.

[It's clear here the more non-rational-than-rational is confused with irrational, consciousness-as-such becomes irrational, not conducive to that union with the absolute you hope for, for some sense of stability. If you were my counselee I'd guess -- but shake loose the thought rather than empathetically transfer it -- your early childhood was unstructured or chaotic enough to repress, that your earliest memory is of feeling the imperative need to withdraw emotionally or structure your way out of loneliness.]

{19} [4] The structures are tools

[Not merely nor wholly mine for the best tools I have were inherited, including the tool to create tools]

{20} we create around the center

[Some I modified, others are practically too bulky for computerized work].

{21} As Jaspers said <2>, there is a paradox in a language to end language (i.e., logos

[What does the fleshing out of reason have to do with a language to end language ? What is wrong with putting words into good needs ? Is it because it's biblical?...];

{22} see also TA55 C42 <5>)

[Let's look at it and the footnote. You state the problem is that a concept-free and language-free state is sought erroneously by starting with concepts and language and that means disallowing one's own structures. Realizing this needs clarifying, in the footnote you mention a few -- and I say of the countless -- who disallow structure and start over, but you say they are insincere about it compared to your "0-D." They use it as a "philosophical fancy" or "end point" which simply put, must be distinguished from what you mean. 0-d must be "0-D." To me that's like painting common sense yin and yang on a button, then after stringing it, twist it, and twirl it till it whirls and whines -- until it disappears. But you want to put a governor on it, slow it down so all can see at the speed you require, while getting a biblical proportion of credit for yen and yan, and meanwhile eliminating from reason the ground of being for it might interfere by creating critical thought processes that could reveal the truth. The unnatural rationalization restrains an off-the-invisible button leap-of-faith decision in moments of emerging crises, restrained by the instability of the groundlessness of zero derivation.],

{23} but that is implied in human thinking from the start.

[I wasn't there at other's starting point so hesitate to disagree though it's not inconsistent with my first memories; but here Jaspers was specifically referring to Nirvana]

{24} A wholly logical world (as in Whitehead-Russell's principia mathematica) would not be available to us, it would also be frozen, non-functional (cf TA31 on Feyerabend). Indeed the absurdity can prompt intense reflection

[Revelation by concealment in this manner is a philosophical whim or fancy or end point used as a starting point. You want to sublimate a concept because basically conceptualization is presumed sublime.]

{25} about, or returning to, the most central (i.e., unstructured) part of experience, including perhaps even mystical procedures like union of the individual with the absolute, etc.

[We'd like to return to the cradle of consciousness-as-such or be conscious with no responsibility as in an actual or wished for normal and responsible parented home life. The wish becomes compulsive as the need for rest intensifies as seen in chronic and acute suicides -- an out-carnation of incarnation or quest for zero derivation, the antithesis to normal reason.]

{26} [5] This latter possibility was usually prohibited in pseudo-religions like Marxism, which based themselves on a postulated scientific certainty of MIR-knowledge (without embarrassment nor doubt***), and took themselves to be wholly rational. Scientific certainty is, just like religious certainty

[Scientific certainty is more dangerous than religious faith as in the most recent preventable shuttle disaster -- even truckers check tires before road reentry. Talk about embarrassment. It's so stupid the only reason it's not an issue is because there's a general awareness that it could be terrorism. Faith in God includes a healthy distrust of science.],

{27} a fiction based on belief in MIR (reality mind-independently - externally - pre-structured, either by God or by Nature

[This sounds like another "MIR" chant. If by "God" you do not mean superficial doctrinal ecclesiastical religion, your understanding of religion as Mind-independent reality, as pre-structured, external, is so abnormal it leaves the same feeling one gets during a session with someone with a schizophrenic core, the feeling is that the person is not really there in the normal sense.]

{28}), but usually without Tertullian's recognition of absurdity.

[I don't comprehend how Tertullian's religious experience relates to your religious experience and your reasoning here. Tertullian would today be classified as a charismatic or as a Pentecostal in some ways, leaning toward the prophetic, spontaneous venting of the soul more than the ecclesiastical spirit or regulated forms, liturgical and authoritative guidance; like leaning toward the incarnation of the Holy Spirit in the believer. In other ways Tertullian is comparable to Campbellite movement's escape from the rigid disciplinarianism, exclusivity, and control of Presbyterians not far removed from Episcopalianism -- England's form of Catholicism. For instance, Tertullian would not baptize infants for they could not be educated which was reducing an absurd irrational doctrine to the rational.]

{29} This lack

[I guess you mean this lack of spirit, this law of creeds, this practicing of ritual,

this having the form of Godliness but denying the power thereof]

{30} interferes with a possible return to original non-structured experience

[the American movement away from church-and-state ecclesiasticism was a wholesome break and allowed for the freedom to return to the biblical faith. Some, adhering only to biblical Christianity, called it the restoration movement -- rather than a reformation effort -- a return to faith prior to the apostasy in early AD].

{31} Fortunately, there is now a growing awareness that certainties are fictions, [This awareness should be directed toward the fictions after the apostasy in church history, but biblically speaking, faith is the substance of things hoped for and the essence of things not seen -- uncertainty can make room for a forgotten faith here, but it's not that faith is a mere sublimation of uncertainty; it can be thought of like that but it has a transcending source in terms of the ground of potentiality]

{32} with a chief side-effect of restricting the field of vision

[I understand how this can be a blockage -- e.g. Shuttle disaster -- of a healthy digestive process, but it cannot be said of biblical religion. It seems you want to stuff me into that restricting category though you cannot. It's hard to kick at zero-derivation but still harder to kick a resilient faith].

{33} [6] Severe practical problems can arise when differing belief systems operate in social conflicts

[Severe problems arise from within belief systems too, so that signifies little].

{34} As you may know, the population of central Europe was reduced to about half in the 30-years war (1618-1648) between Catholics and Protestants, fought primarily

[Here is needed a criterion of truth and a "0" rest from epistemological presumptions. Your position that religion as you understand it is a stabilizing force puts you in the position of saying that if there had been no reformation movement, no separation from Roman Catholicism there would not have been the Thirty Years War which you take to mean religious war. It was not faith in mind-independent powers, rather it was economics caused in part by a rich Church's property -- not to be confused with religion at all -- that brought about the war. "The immediate occasion of the Thirty Year's War was the acceptance by Frederic V, the elector of Palatine, of the crown of Bohemia, which that nation, refusing to acknowledge Ferdinand as its king, offered to him. Ferdinand,

a nursling of the Jesuits, who had early taken a vow to extirpate heresy in his dominions, threw himself, as much from necessity as from choice, into the arms of the Catholic League." Religion was involved in so far as it was the collusion of Church and State to the exterminate protesting and avoid further loss of assets and resources. Even from that perspective religion is not the culprit but rather the quest for power. Fisher p. 409 -- See TA51 bibliography]

{35}

though not exclusively about religion

[Hardly at all. The situation was far more complex than "My theistic doctrine is better than yours" and, as today, "O-D" would still mean the extermination of protests by leaders heading institutions under momentum the continuation of which becomes it's mission, for truth is not the issue but power.

{36} I like the two volume work by Ernst Troeltsch "The social teaching of the Christian Churches" and refer you to the section on Calvinism and International Policy. Calvin's and Luther's view of the Wars of Religion were similar: it "is a matter which concerns the State, which is permitted to use it for the secular purposes of defense ... and the interests of religion, on the other hand, must be promoted without the power of the sword, purely in dependence of Providence, through suffering and endurance; they are not to mingle with secular methods of exercising power." (p651) But in the civil defense against France, Savoy, and Berne, including the persecutions of protestants like the Huguenot -- they were not even allowed in Spain -- and the fortunes now made the responsibility of the States of the independence movement, military intervention had to be addressed and theoretically justified.

{37} Having quoted above from other earlier occidental sources, putting the Dalai Lama on the same level, I can now quote him in support of the view that the Thirty Years War was not as religious as economic: "The Dalai Lama proposed that a chamber of 'experienced and qualified' individuals from the field of education, politics, the economy and religion should take precedence when the existing U.N. political bodies were deadlocked." (World Tibet News Oct. 26, 93) Note the conjunction "economy and religion." That is somewhat how so called religious wars should be viewed.]

{38} And many of the present armed conflicts have strong religious components as well

[That's somewhat apparent in traditional theocracies (church and state) fighting over symbols of external centers of provincial ongoing experience -- Islam in reaction to Catholicism and Zionism. But even these are economical and includes

the use of intolerable behavior as weapons.].

{39} The 20th century was, on the other hand, characterized by the promotion of pseudo-religious doctrines, also with deadly side-effects. In each instance, the beliefs were officially immune to doubt, and - to put it mildly - enforced by the authorities. They were one of the principal driving forces in these conflicts, and tended to make attitudes inflexible.

[Jaspers endured and observed this phenomenon, analyzed this disastrous distortion of truth and worked on his Philosophical Logic, with his Jewish wife, (indices contributed to by Maria Salditt, teacher and Catholic) during the time they was in hiding or waiting for extermination. In an itemization of the themes of this work he first lists "the one truth in totality is not to be had; rather: manifold truth is met in historical form" -- the sort of approach we must take to what has erroneously been categorized as religious wars.]

{40} [7] I would like to invite your opinion on the following question : how will it be possible to benefit from religion without, or at least with fewer, such side effects (assuming that we can agree this to be a desirable goal) ?

[I don't agree with your premise, that the conflicts you're referring to are the side effects of religion but your experience with religion differs from my consciousness about religion. You see the competitive rituals and bowing to authority, revering personages, organizations with headquarters, as religion, which is foreign to me]

{41} For instance, how could one get everyone embarrassed

[Embarrassed about the absurdity of faith in the nonrational or irrational, the near and far side of reason?]

{42} to the degree needed for participating in a discussion <1> ? It seems to me that non-theistic religions - like some forms of Buddhism and Hinduism - have an advantage here in that they are closer to original unstructured experience (apeiron, 0-D). They might offer an already functioning fallback position for other creeds that are more handicapped by doctrinal fixation

[The fallback is already in place in the Western frontier where the separation of church and state is being tested and the volitional conversion of each individual is possible. The most effective being the fall back beyond the doctrinal fixation and creeds to using the book which always needs interpreted and guided by the right spirit. What comes from the East that is more nonviolent than the biblical Jesus who made a plea for unity in the Prayer for Unity?]

{43} It is probably less a question of jumping into 0-D <1> than awareness of its availability as a point of reference, or perhaps as a place of temporary rest*. But that is of course only possible if ecumenical dialogue takes place.

[You're more right about the need for jumping somewhere else, for the union of large religious institutions carries more risk than allowing independent churches to form in freedom. You think in terms of organizations like that. The call for the leadership to unite for some particular reason recognizes and further establishes already self-perpetuating authoritative organizations whose mission is survival one way or another. Contrasted with this call for ecumenical union is Karl Jaspers' hope for the conversion of humankind on an individual basis. The best we could hope for here is that the leadership of these organizations might get caught up in the conversion process and prophetically influence their flocks.]

{44} [9] How would you proceed

[The Socratic method now is more clearly applied here, but giving you the benefit of seriousness some kind of response is proper]

{45} if you were the UN secretary general,

[Have you read Jaspers' view of and hope for the U.N. in The future of Mankind? The same despair but hope could be applied to an ecumenical effort.]

{46} the US president,

[Unless you drank a lot during your history courses, wouldn't you avoid talking about the need for a crusade to resolve problems in the near east?]

{47} the pope,

[Would you allow yourself to be called father and still be faithful to the "0-D" formula?]

{48} Billy Graham,

[Remember when he stood on the White House steps with Nixon? Watching it with my father -- a staunch defender of Nixon -- I said: "Graham will be sorry he did that." Years later in an interview (I think by that English fellow, what's his name?) Graham expressed his regrets]

{49} or if you had extremely large financial resources at your disposal - or all of these?

[Why? Have you been talking to Gates or Turner? Wow! You almost tempted me on that one. One can't serve God and mammon but I'd like to prove it. A forewarning though; tell them the funds would not be tax deductible. It's easy to criticize those listed. I would have been less critical if Jimmy Carter's efforts had been mentioned.]

{50} * I don't understand your statement on human attributes <4>; are you suggesting that the Dalai Lama has none ?

[No. The opposite, and that attributes ought not be set aside but rather penetrated where just on the other side we see their enlightening necessity]

{51} The monotony <9> if that is the word you like

[That was Jaspers' word but I do prefer it.],

{52} could be an asset if it is handled as an available point of return

[there's an assumption here that one has left consciousness and acquired something by boot straps. That would be a great miracle and fails to see that time and space are subjective, it is looking beyond being and while looking the revelation of being is possibly passed by.],

{53} rather than as a permanent place of rest

[I'd still like to take that trek mentioned previously with you in a TA through the limits of reason and emotion].

{54} This would be akin to a retreat in a spa

[The affluent afford this ...],

{55} in a monastery,

[In untaxed Church property with a religious name supported also by guilt acquired through tithes]

{56} on a mountain-top

[I like that but at the top of the last one was found a bottle with a note by males propositioning other males],

{57} etc., which offer time for thinking (and un-thinking) through respite from engagement and pressure

[No time nor space for this in the Western busy-busy way except on-the-fly except in perhaps a seminary.]

{58} And this should not depend on the presence of one leading person
[Though we'd like to think so, great leaders keep the need alive, and use or used the best book as reference points so as not to lose contact with the ongoing history of consciousness]

{59} ** Socrates went a step beyond embarrassment and stated clearly that he knew that he did not know (but that is probably too much to expect of people who know what is true and real;

[I was one of those and suspect you were not born with immunity.]

{60} as one will have to make do with embarrassment or similar aids
[like the KJF.]

{61} And furthermore, Socrates practiced Socratic dialogue
[You too/Me too].

*** In social science, of all fields [...].

CUSANUS AND JASPERS DIFFER ON LEARNED IGNORANCE by Glenn C. Wood 8
April 2003, posted 15 April 2003, TA58, C1

I must take a moment to express deep appreciation for DP's TA 58, and for HM's bracketed interpretations which were in keeping with the spirit of KJ's efforts at communication -- the sign of the spirit of learned ignorance in Jaspers' sense and including some of Cusanus' meaning.

However...whereas DP suggests that Cusanus is a copy of Jaspers, is this not a subtle way of saying Nicholas is the original because predating Jaspers? "Cusanus tells us that the concept ... of ... ("learned ignorance") ... [was] bestowed upon him by a higher power: this implies a claim to have been the first to introduce them." Jaspers then adds: "The claim would appear unjustified." (P.120) "Although his faith in revealed religion is alien to us, he seems to say things in which we can recognize our own capacities for faith." (P147) The capacity for faith is to be seen in Jaspers' Philosophical Faith and Revelation and the expressed hope that the two can come together meaningfully and in the

Biblical sense of logos and faith rather than a Church authoritarian system of prohibitions and commands.

What makes Jaspers more than a facsimile of Nicholas is this: "He (Cusanus) did not champion the faith of the New Testament against its corruption by the Church, which claims a monopoly on Christianity and imposes its faith by brute force when it has the means of doing so. Cusanus was not a revolutionary; his own reform activities were carried on within the Church, on orders from superiors." (P.155, *The Great Philosophers*, A Helen and Kurt Wolff Book, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., NY).

KJ was revolutionary in ways, however, touched on by DP, e.g. in the expansion of psychiatry's horizon's by the constant reminder of the mind's limits, and in reestablishing the dynamics of philosophy. It's that faithfulness to the learned ignorance which follows faith in the imageless God of the Bible more than the authority of the Church as a historically large institution.

OWSLEY ON JASPERS' PERIECHONTOLOGY by Glenn C. Wood 29 April 2003 and later, posted 6 May 2003, TA58, C5

PART A

I'm really grateful to you, HM, for making Owsley's piece available. It is as I expected quite elucidating and maybe even revealing. It's questionable though that Jaspers' view changed in any essential way after 1935, as Owsley seems to suggest, and the "following" of Anaximander was primarily -- perhaps only -- chronological.

That's said for fear there's a movement to make Jaspers' worthwhileness dependent on some Church approved personage such as Heidegger -- that fearful mentality which assumes there can be no saint unless the institution grants sainthood according to that tradition since the early centuries AD. Karl Jaspers is influential enough -- to that institution -- to be if not a saint then a misrepresented friend at least of the Sainthood apparatus. If the Church has its sway as in the harvesting of any and all influences, as with Thomas, Jaspers would be St. Jaspers -- if it were not for his miraculous limitation of the Church's exploitation of miracles.

For Heidegger the quest for Being can be hidden or forgotten, as Owsley states, for after all the Church, his Church, was felt needed to handle that quest. Nor does Jaspers "echo" Heidegger in a rebounding sense, though the Church enjoys thinking denominations are off its wall and of less revelational worth.

Transcendence for Jaspers is capitalized as a concept and not because it begins

a sentence; that is not to say Owsley fails to see the origin of subjective and objective inspiration, but he does seem to unnecessarily protect the Church when he says that "at best Jaspers may be said to provide a kind of prophetic philosophy which is a ['poor'] substitute ['for theology']." Whose theology is being referred to here ? Not the theology grounded in protestant soil. Jaspers "Existenz" philosophy places theology in a substitute status.

On the other hand the contents of Jaspers' forms of thinking may have changed in part due to the influence of Gertrude his wife. He may have taken another more wholesome and personal look at the influence of the Bible on Occidental thinking especially the Being of the biblical imageless God. It would be interesting to know the Ehrlich and Ehrlich view on this matter -- without having to purchase their books.

PART B

I found HM's C2 impressive. In <14> he relates experience with reality when pointing out the reason most patients come to him.

Less impressive is the comment that "the MIR [in the sense of the absolute meaning by HM's 0-D] idea may have prevented [Jaspers] from proceeding to a complete constructivism with the result of a kind of semi-ontology [and placing him beside Heidegger]." How is it possible to say this if one has a grasp of periechontology and understands the limits of subjective and objective knowledge? The only reasonable explanation seems to be that 0-D has transcended subjective and objective experience and become an ontology. Jaspers cannot be justly accused of being committed to a or the mind independent reality in any mono-semi - or plural type of ontology. That can be said of Heidegger and that's why the Church looks to him as a modern replacement for Thomas. Constructivism is another of those transcending words academia uses to try to be indispensable, to exist as something of value in the scheme of the educational apparatus. One possible reason for placing Jaspers with Heidegger here is to protect what is naturally (intellectually honest individuals have always used some form of suspended judgment -- individuality did not evolve and appear recently) practical in "0-D" thinking from being preempted by the unsurpassed systematic reasoning of Jaspers. And this is the reason Jaspers is hard to understand by psychiatrists in this area of the world: he is approached with such positivistic concepts and readers do not stick with his train of thought. They like dialectical realism or materialism while avoiding the dialectical ideal; they must have a bit of absolute truth and write theses rather than dissertations.

In <19> HM states that since Jaspers wrote his psychopathology "more effective treatments have become available in psychiatry." I suppose techniques are being

referred to here that includes devices that were unavailable a few decades ago and such as mentioned in C2. Jaspers revised that psycho-pathology over the years and it wasn't outdated while he lived.

As showed through personal experience in <14> would HM give examples of case situations where treatment was used not available to Jaspers and then show from his psychopathology cases that could have been helped by those treatments that were not available in revised General Psychopathology? (*) I'm not doubting anything here, but would like to look-see for myself.

PART C

In a Comment routed or rerouted 4-30 the last paragraph asked for examples -- needless to say without violating confidentiality -- from your experience that would show techniques or apparatuses available today but not 30 or 40 years ago. I suppose you're referring to electric stuff like brain scans <18> that "suggests" a pre-frontal dysfunction and that it is "likely" to exist and that "in case that turns out to be valid" (-- those quotes mentioned here because they don't seem too certain to make a comparison with KJ's therapeutic philosophical Existenz -- a sort of therapeutic metaphysic ... whether that electric stuff can be considered treatment). Perhaps the question needs further clarification and is attempted below.

An "unceasing trying out of mental structures, and determination of their validity (see also TA45)" stated in <13> cannot apply to KJ unless he is misrepresented - - un-maliciously of course. It does not jive with his philosophical logic (forms of thinking) which must destruct if applied to the encompassing we are in and the encompassing that we are, two of Jaspers' concepts for handling ongoing experience. This misunderstanding is perhaps what he meant by the comment that philosophers talk but misunderstand one another. It reminds me of possible geniuses -- if I might be so bold to judge -- that write for the KJF -- and I think vdMeijden referred to this in one of his comments somewhere -- who don't really communicate with others but to one another or something like that. It might be correct to describe them as an encompassing unto themselves.

Clearly the comments in <18> regarding illness and disease is hard to refute and more clearly unnecessary in some particular cases, i.e., if one gets into a brain rut and it becomes the outstanding and current big problem one has to get out of the rut regardless of what it takes and that might mean the application of chemicals or even shock but does not exclude the comparable intense experiences such as the religious experience of the founder of AA's program; and alcoholism by the way is going through or gone through the question of whether it is a disease (which is mainly questionable because of insurance costs and in that way mainly becomes involved with forensic medicine).

What my question looks to is the ultimate complex causes which might belong to psychology and psychopathology more than psychiatry's response to critical or emergent moments. HM's description of Szasz' views gets into the area of my interest, i.e., the relation of the moral question without underestimating the chronic within the acute. But comparing him with Jaspers makes me uneasy, for, meaning by association here could discredit Jaspers and there could probably be made a strong case that there's more dissimilarity in the association than what is stated -- for HM still seems to see the need to make Jaspers a less than functional ontologist, and this comparison assumes HM interpretation of Szasz is correct, i.e., his comparison of psychotherapy with the presumed primacy of the Catholic confessional, and psychiatry with something more irreligious than nonreligious. Gay researchers may find abnormalities in the brain which could be interpreted as "special" and therefore a precipitating cause because more obvious or posited than the more complex and dispersed social phenomena. That participates in defensive brain-myth thinking more than the healthy brain-mythistic historic awareness that as man thinks so is she. It becomes a moral issue not so much for individuals as for institutions and their contributions to a developing culture not to mention their privileged exempt status regarding civil or criminal prosecution. Institutions have the rights and privileges of individuals but not the responsibility and are protected from prosecution. I mean if a child is subjected to sexual abuse religiously such as in a church setting it is not unreasonable to see a causal connection with cerebral processes leading to criminal behavior. (And, by the way, the Catholic confessional is not the biblical meaning of confessing to one another or the meaning of what is meant by the Great Confession of Peter.) [I easily challenged the editor's note below in another posting. See p. 256]

(* In answer to Wood's question I will respond first in a practical fashion (other aspects can be discussed later if desired) : The psycho-pharmacological treatments in particular have been developed after Jaspers' time, and though there are still many problems with them, they have made it possible to decrease the need for long-term (and involuntary) psychiatric hospitalization. Since then, for instance in our hospital the number of in-patient beds has decreased from about 2000 to 254, and the latter are not for long term care but for more specific short-term problems. This change has been accompanied by a simultaneous development of services in the community, which have greatly increased, replacing hospital treatment. – HFJM

JASPER AND SZASZ On SUFFERING by Glenn C. Wood 13 May 2003, posted 20

May 2003, TA58, C8

It was soothing to read David Herman's thoughts regarding a misunderstood Szasz. DH is probably more than a little correct, at least enough so as to wet my interest in Szasz. If a clear communicator such as Jaspers (whose worth is in reason rather than a title of distinction -- such as "Dr") can be so easily misrepresented in subjective structures, so can Mr. Szasz.

When time permits, a study of similarities and differences between Szasz and Jaspers regarding pain and suffering would perhaps be meaningful in clearing up some misunderstandings. Jaspers includes suffering as one of several ultimate situations but only after the limits of thinking had been reasonably established.

For Jaspers the limits of thinking continues to manifests itself in the ultimate particular situations of death, suffering, guilt -- and such is unavoidable (realistic ontological thinking), not to be sought (as in ontologism), has a dual aspect (also has nothing to do with Descartes), includes the possibility of awakening Existenz within life's ultimate situation and can be seen as necessary to the illumination of wholesome thinking; and then qualifies for inclusion in our -- less than radical -- structuring (philosophical logic [wisdom begins with fearful awareness of limits] rather than the ontological or metaphysical [superiority views based on logic and physical science]). There's no loss sight of the precariousness of thought (and emotional states too) nor the need for faith in the image-less God -- as life, rather than death, is sought but not unconditionally.

MULLER IDENTIFIES IMAGELESS WITH TERRORISTS by Glenn C Wood 28 May 2003, posted 3 June 2003, TA58, C11

<1> HM comes across as too (extremely) functional when he says "Traditional mind-independent objective reality and truth (ontology, MIR, scientific or other) is a non-functional fiction." A weakness or limit in the statement is "or other" for it presumes 0-D (zero derivation [even Gould recognizes the value of trauma; and Jaspers' ultimate situations are more grounded than "0-D"]) which becomes an O-ontology--a dysfunctional encompassing (an 0-D in ... reality ... meaning Ontologically-Dysfunctional) when applied to "or other."

<2> Undefined religion has a more-than rational function and ought not to be associated with the radical rationalism of suicide bombers as done in <8>. The traditional mind-independent biblical imageless God is functional and is not a myth to the believer -- though institutional traditions have misinterpreted God in dysfunctional ways, i.e. when mythical content (knowledge) replaces faith. HM's formula when applied to "or other" seems to change this biblical God into an

ontological assertion and then declares God an impossibility replaced by 0-D; then God, not only unseen by 0-Derivationists but disbelieved due to faith in a creed-like formula (see Jaspers comments about the limits of creeds in Philosophical Faith and Revelation).

<3> On the other hand in <8> HM gives content ("desirable function") to the myth of 0-D when he says basic needs determine uniformity but less uniformity is clear in religious areas -- news to those living in faithless hopelessness and who practice a radical irreligion religiously. Though less clear it seems HM holds that the "0-D" is still necessarily unfolding itself prophetically. The effort at universalizing "0-D" here might be more defensively gallant than objectively real.

<4> One could suppose vGlaserfeld's suggested consideration of Fleck's work was made because discussion could be confined more than less to a purposeful view of science proper such as bacteriology as in syphilis -- anything thing to distract from "or other" where radical constructionism dare not tread. Here again reference is made to Jaspers' comments about factors not limited to bacteriology's limits (see last paragraph in my comment to HM's response after the conclusion of TA58 C5 Wood "Jaspers and Treatment").

JASPERS APPLIED TO UPDATED THE PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGICAL
by Glenn C Wood
28 May 2003, posted 10 June 2003, TA58, C12

<1> At the conclusion of my TA58C5, HM provides a brief "practical" response to my question regarding an alleged outdated Jaspers and psychiatric patients. There are many problems remaining as HM states -- as though there has been progress post modern constructions like 0-D. An investigation might be in order into the other factors surrounding the reduction of in-patient and long-term beds -- beginning with some questioning of the significance of the math of "2000 to 254." What constitutes voluntary and involuntary in "reality" is also something to wonder about.

<2> In Man In The Modern Age, Jaspers, in the section on "technical mass-order and human life" he suggests there's often more to the problem than meets the statistical eye. "The inclination to apply a new ... method of treatment to the majority of patients coincides with the organizational will [community services -- GW comment] of the masses who have been trained in the school of modern technique -- with the will of those who contend (mostly under stress of political emotion) that they can bring healing to all. 'Enterprise' has taken the place of individualized care ... A maximal exploitation of the advantages of public services misleads both patients and doctors."

<3> Perhaps the "patients" have learned how to get a job with the help of social workers whose evaluations and pay increases depends on getting jobs for their caseloads. Statistics and politics can easily be misused though innocent efforts to establish "0" beds might establish the value of "0-D." It is still quite questionable -- at least to me -- how much involuntary and voluntary stuff is really involved when social workers throw the weight of the political organization into helping patients survive in the community; and what does this do to the normally-behaved independent self-hoods who have to compete in the job market is a question perhaps post-modern constructionist doctors cannot answer.

What are those 2000 beds currently being used for? Are they empty? Have they been filled perhaps by patients whose primary disease is not outstandingly and initially psychiatric? -- those it is politically incorrect to mention but whose diagnosis simply includes concomitant symptoms? If they are empty perhaps in a little while they will be filled with some overworked and conscientious social workers. After all there is a tendency as Jaspers says "to go on the sick list" and we might add there is a tendency to avoid unemployment and gain some basic needs by submitting to a regime of medication and the physicians' limited logic ("psycho-pharmacological" is one of those words which extends into the myth content side of transcendence -- part of the modern real technical apparatus).

Jaspers (who was writing *Man In Modern Age* in 1931 though it seems he's writing for today's healthcare problems) cannot be dismissed so easily to make room for radical constructionistic systems demanded by school standards. And this leads to the HM's comment C9 (to C3 by vGlaserfeld):

Comment to TA58C9 (to C3 by vGlaserfeld) -- Appreciate vG's statement that Jaspers is not known that well. Please review Jaspers *General Psychopathology's* section of the *Significance of the Social Situation for the Illness* (the abnormal psyche). Note the footnote reference to a 1911 work by Kirchhoff that supports Jaspers views on the question of the existence of syphilis in ancient times and the problem of whether "over lengthy periods -- quite apart from the cultural factors ... certain definable forms of illness change their mode of manifestation ... "

And now a flip to HM's Fleck comment ... (see C11 to TA58)

ANOTHER CHARDIN, BERKELEY, AND POPE by Glenn C. Wood 26 June 2003,
posted 8 July 2003, TA60, C3

<1> Nothing essentially new presented here by Grandpierre. It's reminiscent of

Pierre Teilhard De Chardin in general, and comparable to Joseph Johnson's TA in particular.

<2> In 17th century England, George Berkeley merited the eulogy of Alexander Pope on the issue of natural religion for it was as popular then as attempted now. Berkeley sought a defense of theism in an ideal theory of matter not unlike TA60. Berkeley held that only minds exist and the notion of a hard lump of matter is a figment of fancy. I don't disagree with the flux of stuff, but his idea that the divine mind imparts ideas according to a fixed order and such is clearly seen in the laws of nature is one of those miracles that can be used by an established Church's claims on nature's humankind. That establishment, presumed to be the evolving or unfolding unquestionable nature of things, includes collusion between nature and nature's Church. It corresponds with the idea that religion is a natural and necessary stabilizing force, and the test is the forcefulness of the application of its administration and the execution of its laws.

<3> Due to the misuse of established Church authority, it easy for me to see the need for a safe standard, and the standard being the Bible, as an undeniable part of an empirically grounded general consciousness. Natural religion then can be entertained if the Bible is the authority and not some organization's traditions so prone to error. HM might adamantly object to this periechontology charging it's a dogmatic ontology. But what is preferred as substitute for the stability HM sees as good? Church Tradition as ultimate authority does what Hume warns against; it creates habits of thinking. When one thing follows another we transfer without warrant the necessity to the things themselves and belief then can become a habitual association of mental states. That's why visual aids and icons are utilized, and why some degree of healthy iconoclasm has existed since Moses. The will of humankind is dissolved by an illusive inference.

<4> By the way, A. Pope was reared Catholic in an environment that made his parents relocate for Catholics were forbidden from living within ten miles of London or Westminster. His mistreatment at a Catholic school could have contributed toward his tolerance for erroneous treatment and erroneous bishops -- like Berkeley. He wrote "Nor in the Critic let the Man be lost." "To err is human, to forgive, divine ..."

<5> Those forgetting histories are prone to the vain repetition of some of it, and that is unnatural and less than divine. TA60 can be credited for stimulating this response.

MULLER DANCES TO NEW SONG-AND-DANCE (Ed. Note) by Glenn C. Wood 12
August 2003, posted 26 August 2003, TA60, C9

<1> During the next few months I'll be involved in some "concrete phenomena" or stuff and will not have the time -- unless circumstances change -- to prevent what appears to me a tendency to exploit Karl Jaspers and the quality of science and its limits he represents. It seems that somewhere between the possible and the probable that there's an aggressive search for talented contributions that distract from such a quality of Biblical proportion.

<2> Giving the benefit of trust rather than doubt regarding sincerity, AG seems to recognize that novelty is limited to an epoch -- the last 2000 years of Greek and Chaldean influence -- a period of time in which what is new is what is appealing. It is a "new" song and dance in the context AG mentions -- he seems to think -- something at which AG appears to be quite popular.

<3> Whereas there's some discomfort in what appears to him a lack of precision in my comments, suffice it to say at this point that the precision TA60 displays is primarily in playing nomenclature as an instrument. The notes amount to an uncertainty principle -- which I can clearly comprehend when compared to positivism -- replaced by an artful song and dance where principle as a word is elevated to a principle as an ontology because artfully manifested and entertaining. One those resounding and applauding in the choir is HM who is edging close to AG -- and an identity of thought has only a few remaining matters to be more artfully than precisely honed; it's hoped "Principlism" is not far from the "0-D."

<4> It's popular to emotively claim lack of precision toward anyone mentioning the Bible as a needed standard. It's as popular as the thinking that there must be something dialectically -- materialistically and/or idealistically -- progressed to or away from in every near or far measurement (and here metamathematical nomenclature will soon flood the stage).

<5> Now, if Karl Jaspers' expressed approval of the Bible as a reasonable standard of faith is going to be shouted down by Evolutional boom-boom noise, then I respectfully request the Forum be given another name. If not, as time permits, I'd like to pursue diligently and adamantly how the title came about [*] and what part was played if any by the few Karl Jaspers' Societies or their representatives.

<6> Could AG be more ... precise ... as to which Bauer of renown is being referred to? When mentioning the Chaldeans does the sphere of influence include in that cradle of civilization the Chaldean Catholic Church? Is the newness sought for within the Greek etc. epoch relative to the influence of Islam and Israel?

[*] The reason for the choice of the name of this Forum is given in the second paragraph of the statement of purpose. The topic of the reaction of philosophers and theologians to evolution is of general interest, and if you feel you have a good case, and do not mind sparks flying, you might present your ideas about this for discussion in a Target Article. – HFJM